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Despite the fact that foreign aid has been around in its present form since World War II, 
foreign aid analysis, especially from the donor's point of view, has been and continues to be 
highly contested. In 1992, the United Nations claimed that "ODA [Official Development 
Assistance] allocation is 'strange and arbitrary'" and "ODA is determined not by the needs of 
developing countries, but by the fluctuating goodwill of the people and their parliaments in the 
rich countries. As a result, it is largely ad hoc and unpredictable" (United Nations Development 
Programme, 45). This statement cannot, however, explain why Africa is consistently the world's 
most aided region (Lancaster, 487). Something about African countries continually appeals to 
the donor countries, meaning that ODA allocation is not as strange and arbitrary as the UN 
claimed. This begs the question: What motivates donor countries to give aid to countries in 
Africa? 
Peter 1. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor address this question in 
"Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish 
Aid Flows," in which they provide a systematic explanation of donor motivations. In their 
research they examine why America, Japan, France, and Sweden gave foreign aid to 36 countries 
in Africa l from 1980 to 1989. The present study addresses the same question from 1990 to 1999 
and draws largely on Schraeder et a1.'s work. However, the end of the Cold War was a turning 
point for donor motivations. Traditional military issues, such as containment and military 
alliances with recipients with greater military abilities, began to decline in importance. Issues 
that had previously been overlooked, such as regional stability, became increasingly important, 
and countries with the ability to affect that stability became important strategically for donors 
I Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(formerly Zaire), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone. Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
looking to prevent the need for military intervention. Meanwhile, economic issues also became 
increasingly important. Thus, this study largely replicates Schraeder et al.'s research, but it also 
goes beyond Schraeder et al.'s work to examine the changes brought about by the end of the Cold 
War. 
The first section of this research provides a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature that researchers use to explain donor motivations. Particular attention is paid to the 
competing theories in the field. The second section sets forth the research design and variable 
operationalization of the present study. Finally, the third section contains the analysis, findings, 
and conclusions of the research. 
Literature Review 
There are three general theories of donor motivations that researchers acknowledge as 
possible explanations for their findings. They are the idealist, realist, and neo-realist 
explanations, and they are all widely supported by empirical research. These theories provide 
not only explanations for why governments choose certain recipient countries, but they are also 
justifications that governments use to earn their citizens' support for their policy choices. 
Idealist Theory 
The idealist theory posits that governments use aid to promote humanitarian concerns. 
Idealist scholars are optimistic about foreign aid's ability to solve the problems of Third World 
poverty and underdevelopment. Thus, this theory also asserts that donors may give foreign aid 
to support the spread of democracy and human rights. In short, idealists believe foreign aid is 
based on humanitarian need. Many researchers in the field have come to similar conclusions that 
countries with lower income on a per capita basis receive more aid than middle-income countries 
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(Dowling and Hiemenz, 540). A conclusion from a textbook on economics states that donors use 
their foreign aid in ways that favor the poorest countries over the middle-income countries (Gillis 
et ai., 378). These findings strongly suggest that donor countries give foreign aid based on 
humanitarian need. 
Realist Theory 
The realist theory contrasts sharply with the idealist theory and was widely accepted 
toward the end of the Cold War. Realists believe that foreign aid policies are made with strategic 
concerns in mind, such as national security and self-preservation (Schraeder et ai., 296). Thus, 
"foreign aid is perceived as only minimally related to recipient economic development and the 
humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed" (Ibid). Realist scholars expect 
countries with the most humanitarian need to be passed over by the donor countries if the 
recipient countries cannot also provide significant alliances and military aid. Schraeder et al. cite 
R.D. McKinlay and their own Steven Hook as the founders of research supporting the realist 
theory. In his research, McKinlay concludes that the humanitarian theory, though providing a 
simple moral relationship between donors and aid, is flawed (McKinlay, 447). His research 
shows that France and America, more than any other countries, base their donations on national 
interest. He finds, for example, that America's role as a global superpower concerned about 
security is reflected in its aid donations (Ibid, 451). Steven Hook also argues that foreign aid is 
given purely out of national interest. In his book, National Interests and Foreign Aid, he states 
"the fundamental principle of aid giving as 'the price of affluence' has been accepted by nearly all 
industrialized states, which have added the fiscal aid institutional components of foreign aid to 
their diplomatic arsenal" (Hook, 21). He begins his book with a quote by E.H. Carr that sums up 
Hook's findings and beliefs: "the accepted standard of international morality in regard to the 
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altruistic virtues appears to be that a state should indulge in them so far as this is not seriously 
incompatible with its more important interests" (Ibid, 3). Thus, scholars in this vein would argue 
that aid is given only when it agrees with national interests. 
Neo-realist theory 
The neo-realist theory is the third general theory that is widely accepted by researchers in 
the field. It is an evolved (post-Cold War) form of the realist explanation. National interests still 
form the basis of foreign aid, but the focus shifts from national security and self-preservation to 
economic interests. Neo-realists argue that donor countries use aid in ways that promote their 
economic interests (Tuman et aI., 89). Thus, donors will give more aid to the countries that have 
the most to offer them by way of exports, access to raw materials, and industrial competitiveness. 
In short, donor countries give foreign aid to "create export and investment opportunities, 
particularly in larger countries that offer large markets to [the donor country's] firms" (Ibid). In 
their research, scholars challenge the idealist theory, claiming that "many donor governments 
have indicated that, in their aid allocations, they also take their own national interests into 
account [such as] maintaining spheres of influence, [... ] or simply of promoting their own export 
trade" (Maizels and Nissanke: 879). Schraeder et al. found that economic interests dominated 
Japan's motivation, with the top recipients providing essential raw materials for Japanese 
industry, serving as a potential source of such raw materials, or providing major markets for 
Japanese products (Schraeder et aI., 312). Thus, many scholars would argue that national 
interests, especially economic interests, are the determining factor for deciding who will get the 
foreign aid. 
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Combining the three theories 
Recent research supports the conclusion that donors do not give aid for only one reason. 
Instead, they prioritize their donations so that they may give aid in ways that support all three 
theories, but with different degrees of importance. Research by Schraeder et ai. shows that in the 
1980s the United States was primarily concerned with military possibilities, secondly with 
economic potential, next with anti-Communist countries, and lastly with helping countries 
plagued with lower economic growth rates than the rest of the African countries. These findings 
support all three theories. France was found to give the most weight to spreading its own 
culture, thereby giving more aid to former colonies, and secondly to countries with greater 
strategic importance to France, thus supporting primarily the neo-realist theory and to a lesser 
extent the realist theory. Sweden's helping former Portuguese colonies first, then countries with 
a socialist ideology, and lastly countries with higher GNPs per capita means it also supports a 
mixture of the theories. The first two motivations are strategic in nature and have to do with 
Sweden's attempt to maintain its sphere of influence during the Cold War. The third motivation 
is economic, as a higher GNP per capita means a larger market. Other researchers have found 
that although "Japan did target economic assistance to countries with lower per capita income," 
their economic national interests played a much greater role, as "aDA was used to promote 
Japan's national economic interests," showing the dual motivations of neo-realist and idealist 
motivations (Tuman et aI., 98). Therefore, there is the possibility that aid motivations may be a 
mixture of the idealist, realist, and/or neo-realist theories. 
The end of the Cold War made it possible for donor countries to diversify their reasons 
for giving aid. Ideological stance was a key factor for determining the recipients of foreign aid 
during the Cold War because the United States in particular would not support Marxist or 
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socialist regimes, while Sweden supported socialist countries. However, a region-wide 
recession and the rise of pro-democracy movements caused leaders of all ideologies to reassess 
their political and economic ideologies. The fall of Communism and the end of the Cold War 
played no small role in accelerating the wave of change to capitalism. Increasing IMF 
requirements of restructuring economies and political systems according to free-market 
principles also spurred the change. By 1993, all previously Marxist countries had converted to 
capitalism, and Libya was the only country in Africa that was officially committed to a version 
of socialism. Thus, donors were no longer limited to helping some countries and not others 
based on their ideologies in the 1990s. 
Donors did not need to maintain their military alliances created for the purposes of 
containment after the Cold War. Countries with large militaries went from being favored with 
aid due to their ability to aid in containing Communism to being perceived as something of a 
threat to regional peace and stability in the aftermath of the Cold War. Thus, what qualifies as a 
strategic military benefit to the donors begins to change after the Cold War. Countries with· 
smaller militaries become preferable for donors because they have less potential to threaten 
peace and stability within their regions through civil or external wars. 
Thus, by no longer needing to buy allies as they did during Cold War, donor countries are 
more free than ever before in the history of foreign aid to give aid for a multitude of reasons. 
Therefore the importance of humanitarian and economic causes increases in the 1990s and 
donors are able to mix and match their aid policies to pursue many different ends. Thus, in the 
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aftermath of the Cold War, it is unexpected that any donor country would give aid purely for one 
reason, humanitarian, military, or economic, alone.2 
Research Design 
This study hopes to reach new conclusions regarding donor motivation by comparing the 
results of this study to the results of Schraeder et al.' s research. At a time when the pool of 
foreign aid donors was shrinking and most governments were making cuts in foreign aid 
contributions, it can be expected that donors gave higher priority to countries that satisfied their 
qualifications, making the decade immediately after the end of the Cold War an ideal time period 
to study in order to determine donor motivations. This study hopes to confirm that the end of the 
Cold war coincided with a decrease in the motivational power of strategic military interest as 
expressed through the importance of the recipient's military capabilities and an increase in the 
importance of countries having smaller militaries. This study also hopes to show the expected 
increase in the motivational powers of humanitarian causes and economic benefits that 
conespond with the end of the Cold War and greater freedom to pursue more ends through 
foreign aid. 
The donor countries of this study are the United States, France, Sweden, and Japan. They 
are all known for their major contributions in Africa, relative to other donors. As northern 
2 There is a fourth theory in the field: the neo-Marxist paradigm. Neo-Marxists share the neo-realist's belief in the donor 
country's goal of profiting from giving foreign aid. However, neo-Marxists see donor countries as actively seeking to keep 
recipient countries from moving up in the world while profiting from the relationship and increasing economic disparity in 
recipient countries. Neo-realists believe that donor countries have at least some interest in tJ1e prosperity of the recipient country 
because of the markets it provides. Such a theory is intrinsically difficult to test, and therefore lacks empirical research to support 
it. Therefore, though this theory is a compelling explanation, indeed, one that has held considerable sway with scholars for 
decades, it must be excluded from this research. For an intriguing though non-empirical first-hand account in support of the neo­
Marxist paradigm, see Nanda Shrestha, "Becoming a Development Category," Power of Development (Jonathan CrUSh, Ed), 
(New York: Rutledge, 1995). 
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industrialized democracies all four donors also share similar characteristics. However, they play 
significantly different roles international politics, and as such, have varying motivations for 
giving aid. The recipient countries remain the same 36 African countries that Schraeder et a1. 
use in their research, with it being noted that Zaire became the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
In a departure from Schraeder et al.'s research, this research adds South Africa to the study 
because beginning in 1994 with the end of Apartheid the four donors began contributing foreign 
aid to South Africa for various reasons. South Africa is a valuable case due to its struggle for 
democracy, having enormous humanitarian need due to the AIDS epidemic, and its prospects as 
a trade partner. The reasoning behind the selection of these 37 cases is that it provides a large 
number of cases with considerable diversity while avoiding complications that might arise from 
subsystem differences that could come up when comparing countries in Africa with countries in 
other regions of the world. Thus, the research design is a pooled cross-sectional time-series with 
the unit of analysis at the national level. There are a total of 370 cases. 
The dependent variable throughout the research is the amount of foreign aid given to the 
37 countries in Africa by each of the four donor countries. The dependent variable is 
operationalized as the yearly amount of foreign aid given to the 37 African recipients by each of 
the donor countries between 1990 and 1999, which is shown in Appendix A, and is expressed as 
a percentage of the recipient country's GNP in US dollars.3 In order to determine what motivates 
the four donor countries, this research examines three hypotheses, which test the idealist, realist, 
and neo-realist theories explained in the literature review. 
3 Source of data is the OEeD online database: "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1969-2000," 
www.sourceoecd.org.ThemeasureofODAusedisTotaIGrossODA.Itis not divided into loans and grants, but it is only 
financial contributions, so aid such as Food for Peace is not included. Also, for Liberia, Libya, and Somalia, GNP measures were 
unavailabJe, so GOP measures were substituted. The correlation between GOP and GNP for countries that had both measures 
available had a Pearson's R of .995 with a T significance of .000, meaning that the two measures can be substituted without 
biasing the results. Source for GOP data is Statistical Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 2000). 
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Hypothesis 1: Donor countries will increase the amount of foreign aid they give 
recipient countries as the humanitarian need in the recipient countries increases. 
If the research supports this hypothesis, then it will support the idealist explanation of 
donor countries' motivations. Thus, countries with the greatest humanitarian need will be given 
the most aid. Humanitarian need has four measures. The first measure is the average life 
expectancy of the recipient country's population.4 The second measure is that population's daily 
caloric intake.s The third measure is the GNP per capita in the recipient country. 6 This measure 
is tricky because it requires a negative relationship in the analysis to support this hypothesis, as a 
lower GNP per capita shows greater humanitarian need. The final measure is a deviation from 
Schraeder et al.'s work. It is a dummy variable that measures whether or not the recipient 
country has suffered some kind of internal war, civil or ethnic based, for two or more years out 
of the ten-year period.7 Due to the donor countries' commitment to aiding countries suffering 
from such strife and the large number of recipient countries in Africa suffering from this problem 
during the period in question, it is an appropriate measure for this research. 
Figure 1 shows that the donor countries must favor the three countries with the lowest 
average caloric intakes, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Burundi, for this measure to support the 
hypothesis. Figure 2 shows that the donor countries must support the four countries with the 
lowest average life expectancies, Sierra Leon, Rwanda, Malawi, and Uganda, to support the 
4 Source of data is the World Development Indicators, CD-ROM, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001).
 
5 Source of data is the Human Development Reports, (New York: United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1993, 1996,
 
1998, 1999, and 2000).
 
6 Source of data is "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1969-2000." GNP per capita data is
 
unavailable for Liberia, Libya, and Somalia, so GOP per capita is substituted. A correlation between GNP per capita and GOP
 
per capita has a Pearson's R of .982 and a T significance of .000, meaning that the two can be substituted without biasing the
 
results. Source of GOP per capita data is Statistical Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 2000).
 
7 Source of data is The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/ciaJpublications/factbook/, CIA, 2001.
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hypothesis. Figure 3 shows that the three countries with the lowest GNP per capita, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, must be favored for this measure to 
support the humanitarian hypothesis. Figure 4 shows which countries suffered from internal war 
for at least 2 of the years in question. 
(Insert Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 about here) 
The charts immediately below show the distributions of the data over the ten-year period for all 
37 recipient countries.s 
Daily Caloric Intake (in calories) 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
2298.2 2159.00 1610 3336 
Mean Maximum 
52.04 72 
Mean 
903.44 
GNP Per Ca 
Median 
352 
in U.S. dollars 
Minimum 
120 
Maximum 
6484.25 
Hypothesis 2: Donor countries give more foreign aid to countries with strategic 
importance. 
This hypothesis tests the realists' "national interests" argument. Due to the end of the 
Cold War, strategic importance as a motivating factor for giving aid should decrease from 1990 
to 1999. However, events in the Middle East during most of the period in question, but 
especially during the early 1990s, may cause traditional strategic importance to continue to be a 
motivating factor. Also, the increasing importance of regional stability as an important aspect of 
8 Note that for all distribution charts the mode is not included because there are actually multiple modes. 
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*Note that all graphs are created by averaging the data over the ten-year period. 
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strategic importance may mean that strategic importance has merely changed in definition, not in 
its strength as a motivating factor since the end of the Cold War. 
Strategic importance is measured in two ways. The first is the percentage of the recipient 
country's GNP that is spent on the military. The second measure of strategic importance is the 
percentage of the country's labor force that is employed by the military.9 Both of these measures 
were used in the Schraeder et al.'s research. to 
Figure 5 shows that the donor countries must favor Sudan, Angola, and Rwanda for their 
high percentage of GNP spent on the military. However, this illustrates a problem with the data. 
It should be noted that Angola and Rwanda both suffered from internal wars during the period in 
question. Thus, their high ranking in regard to this measure is misleading. They would probably 
not be pursued by the donor countries due to their military potential, but they may receive aid 
from donors hoping to promote peace and stability in the region to avoid the need for military 
intervention. The misleading nature of this data should be kept in mind during the analysis later 
in this study. Figure 6 shows that the donor countries must favor Libya, Angola (again), and 
Egypt for their high percentage of the labor force that is employed by the military if they are to 
be seen as donors positively motivated by strategic importance. This measure is also misleading. 
(Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 about here) 
The charts below show the distribution of the data for the two measures of strategic importance. 
Percenta e of the GNP S ent on the Milita 
Median Minimum MaximumMean 
1% 65%12.76% 9.90% 
Percentage of the Labor Force Employed by the Military 
Mean I Median I Minimum I Maximum 
.83% I .43% I 0% I 7% 
9 Source for the second and third measures of strategic importance is the World Development Indicators.
 
10 Schraeder et al. used a third measure, the maintenance of a military all iance between the donor and recipient country, to
 
measure the strategic importance variable, which, due to a lack of data, I cannot include in this research.
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Hypothesis 3: Donor countries will give more aid to countries with higher economic 
potential. 
Recall that neo-realists argue that economic potential is what motivates donors to give foreign 
aid. Schraeder et al. expected the importance of economic potential to increase in the post-Cold 
War era. This change in priority is due to the fact that after the fall of Communism, many donor 
countries began to realize that they no longer needed to buy allegiance with their foreign aid and 
began to cut back on their contributions. As a result, the competition among recipient countries 
increased as they vied for the remainder of the foreign aid offerings. One way to lure donor 
countries, according to neo-realists, is to provide economic incentives. Thus, one would expect 
to see an increase in economic national interest as a motivator throughout the 1990s. 
This research uses three measures of economic potential. The first measure is the 
importance of trade with the donor country, as measured by the percentage of total imports that 
the recipient imports from the donor country. I I The second measure is the recipient country's 
GNP per capita, because a larger GNP per capita means larger markets. 12 Note that this is the 
same measure as is used to test the humanitarian hypothesis. A positive correlation in the 
models with GNP per capita means that this measure supports the economic potential hypothesis. 
The third measure is a departure from Schraeder et al.'s research. It is a dummy variable for 
whether or not oil is one of the main exports of the recipient country during the period in 
question. 13 Because the four donors in this study are all largely dependent on foreign sources of 
II Source of data is the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (Washington, D,C.: International Monetary Fund, 1992 and 2000),
 
12 Source of data is "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1969-2000." GNP per capita data is
 
unavailable for Liberia, Libya, and Somalia, so GOP per capita is substituted, A correlation between GNP per capita and GOP
 
per capita has a Pearson's R of .982 and a T significance of .000, meaning that the two can be substituted without biasing the
 
results, Source ofGDP per capita data is Statistical Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 2000),
 
13 Source of data is The World Factbook, http://www,cia,gov/ciaipublications/factbookJ, CIA, 200 I,
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oil, their connections with oil exporters are very important to their economies. Thus, the 
potential for the donors' access to oil is an excellent measure of economic potential in Africa. 
Figure 7 shows that based on percentage of trade, the US should favor Egypt with ODA, 
France should favor Gabon, Sweden should favor Ethiopia, and Japan should favor Liberia if 
they are to be considered as motivated by economic potential. Figure 8 shows that based on 
GNP per capita, the four donors should favor Libya, Gabon, and South Africa to qualify as 
donors based on economic potential. Figure 9 shows which recipient countries are oil exporters. 
(Inselt Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 about here) 
The analysis program used for getting the distribution of the data for the imports from each 
donor country, as a percentage of total imports, was unable to compute any of the distributions. 
However, the data distribution of GNP per capita is given below. 
Maximum I 
6484.25 I 
GNP Per Capita (in U.S. dollars) 
Mean Median Minimum 
903.44 352 120 
Hypotheses not dealt with in this study 
It should be noted that Schraeder et al. tested three additional hypotheses that are not 
examined in this research. Regional specialists claim that it is important to look at both the 
regions of Africa and the colonial ties, or cultural similarity, between the donor and recipient 
countries. They argue that donor countries may have a common policy for all countries within a 
region. They also cite France's strong preference for helping its former colonies and Sweden's 
preference for helping former Portuguese colonies as the importance for testing for cultural 
similarity. 
However, the dummy variable measures for these two hypotheses substantially 
overlapped and had coincidental complications that confused the models during analysis. For 
13
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example, all of the former Belgian colonies included in this study, Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Rwanda all suffered from etlmic/civil wars during the period in question. 
A relationship favoring the former Belgian colonies appears to SUpp0l1 the cultural similarity 
hypothesis, when in fact the data is actually showing that donors are motivated by recipients that 
are suffering from internal strife. The additional humanitarian measure of the war dummy 
variable in this research accounts for this possibility. The way Schraeder et al. divide up the 
regions also biases the findings, since some regions contain only a few countries while others 
have as many as 14. 
Other problems with the region and colony measures included substantial overlap with 
the former Portuguese colonies all being in the South region, and certain regions being 
predominantly former French colonies. This high degree of multicollinearity between the two 
measures leads to inaccurate findings with regression models. In addition, with the end of the 
Cold War, it is logical that donors could now place more importance on their economic and 
humanitarian desires than on propping up countries that were similar for the sake of maintaining 
alliances. Therefore, the hypotheses of region and cultural similarity are not included in this 
research. 
The third hypothesis not included in this research but examined by Schraeder et al. dealt 
with ideology. As explained earlier, ideology becomes insignificant in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. By 1993, Libya is the only country in question that is not committed to capitalism. Thus, 
ideological stance cannot yield any significant correlations in this study because there is little 
variation among the market orientation of recipient countries. Therefore, one of Schraeder et 
al.'s most important variables for their research must be dropped from this research. 
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Analysis, Findings, and Conclusion 
Analysis of the data determines what motivated donor countries to give aid to recipient 
countries from 1990 to 1999. A normal Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model run 
through STATA for each of the four donors provides the bulk of the analysis. However, research 
by Beck and Katz shows that in research where there is a large number of cases relative to the 
time period in question, as is the case in this research, normal OLS models may greatly 
exaggerate the confidence of the findings. As a check on the normal OLS regression models, the 
four models were run through STATA a second time to get Panel-Corrected OLS regression 
models, as recommended by Beck and Katz, which nullify any of the inaccuracies of the normal 
OLS regressions. However, the Panel-Corrected OLS models in STATA cannot give such 
measures as Standardized Beta Coefficients, which allow one to compare the relative weights of 
explanatory factors, and also Adjusted R Squares, which indicate the overall explanatory power 
of the models. Therefore, the Panel-Corrected models serve only as a validity check on the 
substantive and statistical significance findings of the normal OLS regressions and not as the 
basis of the analysis. Basic results of the normal OLS models and the Panel-Corrected OLS 
models are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 14 The full regression statistics are 
given in Appendix B for the normal OLS models and Appendix C for the Panel-Corrected OLS 
models. 
(Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here) 
14 Two measures are dropped from the regression models due to multicollinearity complications that distort the findings if they 
are included in the models. The first is average life expectancy, which has a Pearsons's R statistic of .816 and a t significance of 
.000 with daily caloric intake, and a Pearson's R statistic of .563 and a t significance of 000 with GNP per capita. These 
relationships are logically to be expected. The other measure not included is the percentage of the labor force that is employed 
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Table 1 
NORMAL OLS MODELS FOR THE FOUR DONORS 
UIIUCU ..J'ICUC';' r 'all,,",e 
Indeoendent Variable Coel Std. Beta Sioolt Coel Std. Beta Siaof.t 
GNP Per Caoita rH/El -3.01E-06 -.213 .004""
 
moorts from the Donor rEl .0653
 
-.190 .047' -5.55e-06 
.000"".230 .023" .1368 .708 
Y. of GNP Soent on Military IMl -.0003 -.217 .016" -.0004 -.14E .025" 
Daily Caloric Intake IHl 6.48E-07 .022 .834 -.0000 -.26E .000"" 
Oil Dummy IEl -.0024 .02~ .707 
War Dummy [H] .0071 
-.097 .311 .0013 
.377.235 .023" .0036 .05 
Table 2 
PANEL-CORRECTED OLS MODELS FOR THE FOUR DONORS 
""',"''11:;;'''' oJLULII;; .... , 'U"V'l:O ~r1O''''U''''' 
Independent Variable 
GNP Per Capita [HIE] 
Imports from the Donor [E] 
Y. of GNP Soent on Military rMl 
Dailv Caloric Intake rHl 
Oil Dummv IEl 
War Dummy IHl 
Coel Siqof.t Coel Siqof.t Cae!. Sigolt 
-3.0Ie-06 .004" -5.55e-06 .012' 5.56e-07 .133 
.0653 .082- .1368 .000" A027 .000" 
-.0003 .002** -0004 .003" -0001 .243 
6.48e-07 .868 -0000 .000"' -8.78e-06 .000" 
-.0024 
.139 .0013 .691 -.0012 .062 
.0071 
.042' .0036 335 .0052 .i50­
""sig of t < .01; "sig of t < .05; - means significant at the .05 level in the Normal OLS Model, but not in the Panel-Corrected OLS Models 
C = Cultural Similarity Explanation 
E = Strategic Economic Explanation 
H = Humanitarian Explanation 
M = Strategic Military Explanation 
R = Region Explanation 
Vl""\:;UC'" 
Coel Std. Beta 
556e-07 .050 
4027 .286 
-0001 -.108 
-.409 
-.0012 
-.05 
.0052 
.21 
-8.78e-06 
~UJJU" 
Coel. 
-200e-06 
.04i2 
-.0003 
-6.83e-06 
-0044 
-.0034 
Sia oft 
.631 
.001"" 
.237 
.000"" 
.510 
.017' 
Sig 01 
.002" 
.270 
.00 i" 
.000" 
.000" 
.056 
Coel 
-2.00e-06 
.0412 
-.0003 
-683e-06 
-.0044 
-.0034 
""auo" 
Std. Beta Sia 01 
.014 
.12C 
-.21 C 
.10E 
-.25~ .001" 
-.31 : .001" 
-.22: .002" 
-.14E .061 
The United States 
The United States has a fairly weak but significant regression model in terms of its 
Adjusted R Square of .1351 with an F significance of .0006. Nevertheless, the model shows that 
the U.S. supports all three hypotheses and theories. The U.S. is most strongly motivated by 
helping countries that suffer from internal strife, as the war dummy variable has a standardized 
beta of .235 and a t significance of .023. This finding supports the U.S.'s commitment to helping 
countries suffering from brutal civil/ethnic wars and, to some extent, helping countries struggling 
to establish or maintain democracy. It thus supports the humanitarian hypothesis, and therefore 
the idealist theory of donor motivations, which holds that donors give aid for humanitarian 
reasons. 
Second in explanatory strength for the U.S. is the measure of trade, which has a 
standardized beta of .230 and a t significance of .023. This means that the U.S. prefers to help 
countries with which it has more trade. This finding can be explained by the U.S.'s policy of 
giving aid to assist in the development of the private sector in recipient countries while 
promoting U.S. private investment in the recipient countries. This finding supports the economic 
potential hypothesis, and thereby supports the neo-realist theory that claims donors give aid for 
economic benefits. 
The percentage of recipient's the GNP that is spent on the military is the third most 
powerful explanatory measure. It has a standardized beta of -.217 and a t significance of .016. 
The negative relationship, coupled with the knowledge that the U.S. gives the most priority to 
helping countries struggling with internal strife, indicates that the U.S. is no longer motivated by 
military potential - at least not in the traditional sense of seeking out recipients with stronger 
by the military. It has a Pearson's R statistic of .692 with GNP per capita, and .407 with average life expectancy, both significant 
at the .000 level. 
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military abilities. As previously discussed, the countries with the highest military expenditures 
are also mostly countries suffering from internal wars. However, the analysis shows that the 
U.S. helps these countries out first. Therefore, the U.S. has to be favoring other countries with 
much smaller militaries to create the negative relationship. This can be can be explained in two 
ways. First, the U.S. no longer needs to maintain its Cold War alliances, and therefore does not 
need to help countries with larger militaries. In this sense, the analysis shows that the expected 
decline in the motivating power of military potential in the aftermath of the Cold War is 
occurring. However, with the end of the Cold War, issues that were previously ignored, such as 
regional instability, become more prominent. In this respect, the U.S. tries to promote peace and 
stability within Africa by giving aid to countries with smaller militaries. By promoting peace 
through aid, the U.S. can hopefully avoid the need for costly military interventions, such as in 
Somalia, and achieve its stated goal of promoting regional cooperation among developing 
countries. Thus, the definition for what qualifies as a strategic military benefit has changed since 
the end of the Cold War. Therefore, this finding at the same time shows the expected decline of 
military potential in the traditional sense as a motivator, where donors seek recipients for their 
military abilities, yet supports the military potential hypothesis, due to the change in what is 
defined as a strategic military benefit in the aftermath of the Cold War. Hence, it also supports 
the realist theory that donors give aid based on the recipient country's strategic importance to the 
donor. 
The final and weakest motivator for the U.S. is the measure of GNP per capita. The 
standardized beta of -.190 with a t significance of .047 indicates that the measure supports the 
humanitarian interpretation rather than the economic interpretation, which would have required a 
positive relationship. The U.S.'s commitment to poverty reduction in recipient countries explains 
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this finding. It therefore supports the humanitarian hypothesis, and therefore the idealist theory 
of donor motivations. 
Thus, the model shows that the U.S. has gone from being equally motivated by both 
strategic importance and economic potential and thirdly by humanitarian need in Schraeder et 
al.'s research to being motivated dominantly by humanitarian need, secondly by economic 
potential, and lastly by military potential in the 1990s. This supports the overall decline of 
strategic military concerns and the increase of humanitarian and economic interests expected 
after the end of the Cold War. 
France 
France has a very strong model with an Adjusted R Square of .5164 and an F significance 
of .0000. France, like the U.S., also supports a mixture of the three donor motivation theories. 
By far the most important explanatory factor for France is trade with the recipient country. The 
measure has a standardized beta of .708 and a t significance of .000. This shows that France 
strongly favors countries with higher economic potential as expressed by trade opportunity. ' 
France's commitment to promoting sustainable development through economic development 
helps explain this finding. It supports the economic potential hypothesis, and therefore the neo­
realist theory of donor motivations, which holds that donors give aid for their own economic 
benefit. 
Daily caloric intake and GNP per capita are the second and third strongest explanatory 
measure for France. With a standardized beta of -.266 and -.213 respectively, and both having a 
t significance of .004 or better, the negative relationships support the humanitarian expectation 
that France gives more aid to countries with greater humanitarian need. France favors countries 
where the people have less to eat and less income, indicating greater humanitarian need, 
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supporting France's claim that it pursues sustainable development in recipient countries through 
poverty reduction. These findings therefore support the humanitarian need hypothesis, and 
hence support the idealist theory, which holds that donors give aid for humanitarian reasons. 
The percentage of the GNP the recipient country spends on its military is the final and 
least explanatory measure of France's motivations for giving aid. With a standardized beta of 
-.146 and a t significance of .025, the finding shows that France, like the U.S., favors countries 
with smaller militaries. As explained in the U.S.'s analysis, this supports both the expected 
decline in the importance of traditional military potential as a motivating factor, yet also supports 
the change in what constitutes military potential after the end of the Cold War and therefore 
supports the military potential hypothesis. The finding hence also supports the realist theory, 
which states that donors give aid for countries that are strategically important to the donor 
country. 
France's model therefore shows that during the 1990s, trade dominates France's 
motivations, with humanitarian need coming in a distant second, and military potential taking 
third place. Thus, France's motivations have changed from Schraeder et al.'s research, which 
found that France preferred to give aid firstly to former colonies for the spread of its culture, 
which this research does not test, and secondly to countries with military potential. These 
findings support the post-Cold War expectation that economic and humanitarian interests would 
increase in motivational power while strategic military interests would decline. 
Sweden 
Sweden's regression model has a weak Adjusted R Square of .1778 and an F significance 
of .0000. Nevertheless, the model supports the idea that Sweden might still be considered the 
darling of the Third World. Three explanatory measures are significant. Of those three, daily 
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caloric intake and the war dummy variable are the first and third strongest measures, with 
standardized betas of -.409 and .217 respectively. Daily caloric intake has a t significance of 
.000 and the war dummy variable has a t significance of .017. Both of these findings support 
Sweden's role as darling of the Third World because they show that Sweden has a strong 
preference for helping countries suffering from greater famine and internal wars, both of which 
constitute greater humanitarian need. These findings support Sweden's claim that it uses aid to 
promote sustainable, positive development for the poor, to foster common security, and to help 
countries suffering from internal wars. Thus, these findings support the humanitarian need 
hypothesis, and therefore the idealist theory, which holds that donors give aid for humanitarian 
reasons. 
Trade is the second strongest measure of Sweden's motivations, so Sweden is not whole­
heartedly devote to the humanitarian cause. The measure of trade has a standardized beta of .286 
and a t significance of .001. This finding shows that Sweden gives preferential treatment to 
countries with which it has more economic opportunities through trade. Trade is one way that 
Sweden pursues its commitment to fostering income equality in recipient countries, but it cannot 
be doubted that Sweden also gets economic benefits from the relationships. This finding 
supports the economic potential hypothesis, and thus the neo-realist theory that donors give aid 
for economic benefits. 
Therefore, Sweden has changed since the period Schraeder et al. examined, when 
Sweden was motivated primarily by helping former Portuguese colonies, which is not tested in 
this research, secondly by countries with a socialist ideology, also not tested because of its 
irrelevance to the recipient countries in the 1990s, and lastly by countries with higher GNPs per 
capita. In the decade after the Cold War, Sweden's motivations changed to helping 
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predominantly countries with greater humanitarian need, due to suffering from famine and 
internal strife, and secondly by economic benefits from trade partners. These findings support 
the expected post-Cold War increase in the motivational power of humanitarian and economic 
interests. 
Japan 
Japan's regression model also supports a mixture of the donor motivation theories. With 
an Adjusted R Square of .3264 and an F significance of .0000, the model as a whole is 
moderately strong. The strongest measure is daily caloric intake, with a standardized beta of 
-.315 and a t significance of .001. The negative relationship shows that Japan favors helping 
countries with greater humanitarian need as expressed by greater famine. This finding supports 
the humanitarian need hypothesis, and thereby the idealist theory of donor motivations, that 
donors give aid for humanitarian reasons. 
The percentage of the recipient's GNP that is spent on the military is the second strongest 
measure of Japan's motivation. It has a standardized beta of -.254 and a t significance of .001. 
As explained in both France and the U.S.'s analysis, the negative relationship both supports the 
expected decline in support for military potential as expressed by the recipient country's military 
ability, and the change in definition of what constitutes strategic military importance because 
Japan may use aid to try to promote peace and stability and avoid the need for military 
intervention. This finding supports the military potential hypothesis, and thereby the realist 
theory of donor motivations, which states that donors prefer to aid countries that have greater 
strategic importance to them. 
The oil dummy variable has the third strongest explanatory power with a standardized 
beta of -.225 and a t significance of .002. The negative relationship indicates that Japan does not 
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specifically seek to help the oil exporters in Africa. This can be explained due to the fact that 
Japan does not rely upon the African oil exporters for the bulk of its oil, so it does not need to 
show them any favoritism. Meanwhile, the countries that do not export oil are largely those 
countries with the greatest humanitarian need, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Burundi, 
which have the lowest daily caloric intake of the 37 countries. Sierra Leon, Rwanda, Malawi, 
and Uganda, which have the lowest life expectancies, are not oil exporters. And the two 
countries with the highest military expenditures, which the analysis shows Japan has a negative 
relationship with, Sudan and Angola, are oil exporters. Given Japan's preferences for aid 
recipients with greater humanitarian need and smaller militaries and Japan's lack of need for 
favoring Africa's oil exporters, it is not surprising that Japan has a negative relationship with the 
oil exporters. This finding does not support the economic potential hypothesis, and therefore 
does not support the neo-realist theory of donor motivations, that donors give aid for economic 
benefits. 
The measure with the least explanatory power for Japan further supports the finding that 
Japan gives aid for humanitarian reasons. GNP per capita in Japan's model has a standardized 
beta of -.21 0 and a t significance of .014. The negative relationship shows that Japan favors 
countries with lower GNPs per capita, and thus greater humanitarian need. This finding supports 
the humanitarian need hypothesis. Therefore, the finding also supports the idealist theory of 
donor motivation, stating that donors give aid for humanitarian reasons. 
Japan's model shows that its motivations have changed in their priorities since Schraeder 
et al.'s research. In the 1980s, economic potential dominated Japan's motivations. In the post­
Cold War era, economic potential is no longer even a motivator. Rather, the model shows that 
Japan is at a stage in its history where it helps countries predominantly for humanitarian reasons 
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and secondly for strategic military reasons. This can be explained by Japan's shifting its aid 
policies away from granting aid purely for economic reasons to more humanitarian reasons in 
Africa during the 1990s. Given the change from military strategic imp0l1ance being recipients 
with large military abilities to recipients that can be stabilized and pacified through aid to avoid 
conflicts, the findings also confirm the expectation that traditional strategic importance would 
decline and humanitarian interests would increase in the decade after the end of the Cold War. 
Double Checking with Panel-Corrected OLS Regression Models 
The purpose of the Panel-Corrected regression models is to serve as a validity check on 
the normal OLS models' substantive and statistical findings. The most impo11ant finding when 
comparing the Panel-Corrected OLS models and the normal OLS models is that the signs of the 
coefficients between the two versions all remain the same. This means that the direction of the 
relationships discussed previously are sound. 
The Panel-Corrected models confirm almost all of the relationships found in the normal 
models. Only the statistical significance of two out of the 15 measures that were significant in 
the normal OLS models become insignificant when tested by the Panel-Corrected models. One 
is the U.S.'s measure of trade, which falls from a significance of .023 in the normal OLS model 
to .082 in the Panel-Corrected version. The second measure is Sweden's war dummy variable, 
which falls from a significance of .017 to .150. Conclusions drawn from these two measures 
should be questioned, but a goal of future research should be to confirm these doubts. 
Conclusions based on the other 13 measures can be held with ce11ainty. 
Conclusion 
This study has tested and confirmed that the United States between 1990 and 1999 is 
motivated primarily by humanitarian need and secondly by strategic military importance. 
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Economic potential dominates France's motivations, followed by humanitarian need and strategic 
military importance, respectively. Sweden can still argue that it is the darling of the Third World 
based on it's being primarily motivated by humanitarian need, but its secondary preference for 
countries with which it has more trade deflates the title a bit. Humanitarian need is Japan's 
primary motivation, and strategic military importance is second. 
Each of these four cases support a mixture of two or all three of the theories of donor 
motivations, showing that the selection of aid recipients is very complex and not without the 
expectation of getting some kind of benefit, be it economic, military, or both, in return. The 
findings support the decline in the traditional sense of strategic military importance, as measured 
by larger military abilities, the change of strategic military importance as a means to prevent 
conflict and promote peace and stability within regions, and an overall increase in the 
motivational powers of humanitarian causes and economic benfits. In this way, the research 
highlights important changes that began with the end of the Cold War. 
Further research on this project should validate that the two measures the crosscheck· 
between the normal OLS models and the Panel-Corrected OLS models calls into question are 
truly insignificant. Creating ordinal, if not interval scales to measure both internal strife and oil 
exportation would likely yield more conclusive results than the dummy variables included in this 
research due to time constraints. Finally, a key goal of future research should be empirically 
explaining more fully the definition of strategic importance that has begun to change as a 
motivator in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
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Appendix A
 
(All charts are given in millions of U.S. dollars)
 
United States Total Gross aDA
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
--,---'---- r-­
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Algeria - - - 2 1 ­ - - - 0.06 
Angola ] ]0 3 ]4 34 3] 25 22 28.76 48.1 
Benin 5 19 ]6 11 ]6 ] ] 7 22 9.53 19.58 
j 
Burkina Faso 11 24 13 ]8 13 ]4 9 ]4 11.451 11.2 
Burundi 18 6 16 18 ]0 23 2 3 0.79[ 15.77 
Cameroon 64 90 28 22 8 3 3 2 7.02[ 6.23 
Central African Rep. 3 4 3 3 ]0 3 2 ­ 0.341 0.92 
Congo, Oem. Rep. 52 43 34 8 ] ] - - 0.J3 11.17 
Congo, Rep. 3 3 4 2 10 7 ]0 ­ 0.13 0.63 
Cote d']voire 22 32 20 2] 23 10 ]5 ]2 22.34 14.99 
Egypt 2477 7779 ]662 942 716 650 761 596 901.75 787.8 
Ethiopia 53 88 68 132 122 70 56 60 53.23 77.35 
Gabon 2 2 2 ] 2 2 2 2 1.86 1.7 
Ghana ]5 ]63 27 46 53 54 30 44 34.32 40.88 
Kenya ]38 204 56 38 29 36 12 ]7 30.7] 39.73 
Liberia ]9 42 ]0 ]2 ]7 ]2 13 ]2 8.67 36.4 
Libya - - - - - - - - - -
Madagascar 28 7] ] 1 25 22 26 33 33 30.34 29.09 
Malawi 2] 54 27 30 28 58 32 27 19.8 27.82 
Mali 
f--­
30 38 30 37 29 3] 5 38 28.47 34.18 
Mauritius 2 ] - - - - - - 0.07 0.11 
Morocco 67 74 70 53 41 18 35 13 31.08 25.62 
Mozambique 62 110 52 61 73 96 45 71 70.45 70.59 
~-. 
Niger 34 39 30 26 19 31 12 16 10.84 6.45 
Nigeria 22 44 ]9 15 ]2 5 5 ]2 3.82 7.48 
Rwanda 13 27 7 26 ]94 ]01 ]0 9 22.98 39.78 
Senegal 57 60 30 42 38 22 43 30 ]4.14 23.]7 
Sierra Leone 3 8 13 9 ] 1 9 ]2 13 1 13.19 17.39 
Somalia 72 6 306 490 350 54 5 6 3.48 ]9.39 
South Africa - - - 66 7] ]07 73 ]04' 83.26 84.6 
.­
Sudan 143 85 Jl 21 85 8 10 17 13.2 71.52 
Tanzania 78 133 27 24 24 18 13 13 29.38 26.45 
Togo 10 18 1] 8 6 3 2 2 1.52 3.85 
Tunisia 44 24 18 7 4 5 ­ 2 0.71 0.09 
Uganda 39 51 22 57 51 49 29 36 35.75 47.4 
Zambia 14 90 125 99 17 23 18 52 14.1 29.59 
Zimbabwe 15 28 91 27 34 29 17 21 26.13 22.22 
France Total Gross aDA 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Algeria 131.17 177.69 227.6 203.09 209.5 184.57 243.12 139.5 118.58 79.11 
Angola 12.17 11.75 27.93 20.49 33.54 38.52 14.29 5.64 7.05 8.65 
Benin 71.95 89.47 42.85 52.31 62.95 61.88 51.69 33.9 37.06 37.17 
Burkina Faso 93.81 125.85 133.39 133.85 113.87 125.13 113.69 68.59 77.34 69.53 
Burundi 43 48.81 43.89 36.96 32.2 26.61 21.81 13.61 11.81 9.62 
Cameroon 213.04 180.5 470.77 465.64 377.87 322.87 291.52 278.08 264.02 234.61 
Central African Rep. 74.15 74.87 76.9 96.53 75.42 69.33 78.95 41.3 41.68 41.02 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 180.18 87.24 32.69 23.31 28.85 32.78 29.4 22.4 18.99 17.28 
Congo, Rep. 169.31 117.09 67.34 97.1 297.83 129.03 250.25 292.36 35.99 32.88 
Cote d'lvoire 501.42 356.55 487.78 622.14 778.62 648.97 488.31 262.57 336.07 305.81 
Egypt 149.66 163.6 301.47 260.68 549.48 503.9 302.6 287.12 317.31 270.38 
Ethiopia 15.41 8.35 10.85 12.37 17.77 10.95 11.17 7.93 10.88 10.87 
Gabon 137.76 126.86 78.24 123.91 207.98 160.74 188.56 87.72 75.39 54.02 
Ghana 12.39 25.92 46.88 27 32.74 28.74 20.98 17.05 10.78 10.5 
Kenya 59.32 40.15 40.02 20.57 22.63 21.55 30.1 16.16 19.54 17.04 
Liberia 1.79 1.45 1.43 1.85 2.1 0.93 0.95 1.34 1.8 0.03 
Libya 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.64 1.67 0.37 0.38 0.88 0.88 
Madagascar 161.17 157.02 156.59 148.98 135.31 139.04 144.23 349.37 100.08 105.4 
Malawi 9.5 9.82 15.3 6.92 1.58 2.2 3.35 2.96 2.2 1.91 
Mali 134.15 99.18 97.64 89.42 100.09 92.95 93.74 73.52 71.1 72.51 
Mauritius 39.11 59.27 42.08 30.37 18.42 33.79 19.15 19.98 17.23 18.94 
Morocco 243.73 312.72 247.75 272.5 177.56 257.79 352.8 214.87 254.69 265.62 
Mozambique 79.01 91.32 91.85 66.35 52.05 60.46 41.76 61.76 53.9 48.99 
Niger 87.89 124.71 
'.. 
113.38 96.06 162.43 90.81 104.29 109.31 80.46 59.84 
Nigeria 6.29 6.13 18.81 7.59 10.23 15.56 6.08 3.98 3.04 5.24 
Rwanda 37.17 43.06 30.16 35.53 29.8 11.75 16.56 16.07 33.17 16.22 
Senegal 250.19 278.48 259.1 226.93 344.34 288.56 230.01 185.74 182.92 263.33 
Sierra Leone 3.25 2.68 7.12 6.06 10.23 6.4 3.67 2.97 1.39 0.49 
Somalia 4.73 4.05 16.75 6.29 5.92 7.74 4.52 4.59 4.24 2.77 
South Africa - - - - 1.88 17.85 13.42 34.01 36.73 27.97 
Sudan 7.22 5.82 5.78 6.07 7.88 7.02 8.12 5.85 8.2 5.42 
Tanzania 4.72 11.88 28.72 20.37 12.2 22.74 5.92 81.52 9.08 6.45 
Togo 96.94 77.82 64.5 49.38 53.79 82.09 48.74 44.75 42.75 30.4 
Tunisia 89.89 104.38 108.51 103.45 79.54 106.62 104.14 87.71 101.11 133.39 
Uganda 7.36 10.42 7.27 6.03 3.57 10.52 13.65 5.93 3.69 2.43 
Zambia 21.39 20.03 14.53 14.35 11.49 8.37 2.06 3.4 10.72 17.96 
Zimbabwe 17.33 18.18 13.9 7.73 12.14 13.11 9.6 2.45 2.75 3.92 
Sweden Total Gross aDA 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Algeria 19.24 1.68 2.23 0.95 1.37 2.96 3.03 0.74 2.81 1.95 
Angola 38.25 31.72 36.2 18.1 32.02 26.52 36.17 27.83 22.54 17.77 
Benin - 0.02 - 0.11 - 0.05 0.01 0.0 I - 0.23 
Burkina Faso 0.11 1.14 0.48 0.71 0.18 0.91 0.79 1.44 1.93 0.63 
Burundi - 1.79 - 2.07 1.48 3.42 4.88 2.97 4.49 3.67 
Cameroon - - - - - 4.04 0.03 - - -
Central African Rep. - 0.94 0.03 0.82 0.01 0.58 0.59 0.44 0.53 0.28 
Congo, Oem. Rep. - 5.67 1.44 3.38 4.08 4 4.46 6.72 4.21 9.3 
Congo, Rep. 0.08 0.58 0.04 1.19 - 0.32 0.56 1.24 10.77 0.89 
Cote d'ivoire - 0.17 - 0.23 - 0.06 0.38 0.15 0.17 0.28 
Egypt 0.64 1.5 0.9 6.13 2.88 7.32 11.83 2.25 1.05 0.9 
Ethiopia 48.93 42.5 45.45 52.26 25.62 39.06 39.3 35.95 32.45 18.88 
Gabon 0.02 - - - - - - - - -
Ghana 1.98 2.53 2.13 3.62 0.43 1.17 3.85 3.76 0.65 0.58 
Kenya 31.19 27.36 28.39 17.97 17.43 19.77 23.31 17.32 15.94 11.32 
Liberia 0.06 0.3 3.76 0.76 1.6 1.35 2.67 5.77 7.57 3.59 
Libya - - 0.03 - 0.02 0.01 0.24 0.1 - -
Madagascar - 5.64 - 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.05 - 4.57 -
Malawi 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.22 0.13 0.43 8.08 5.34 0.19 3.62 
Mali - 0.11 - 0.15 0.01 0.25 1 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.29 
Mauritius 5.84 2.1 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.21 0.04 0.04 - -
Morocco 2.3 2.25 10.54 0.64 0.9 0.94 0.66 0.34 0.33 0.59 
Mozambique 136.08 134.99 97.2 71.78 73.53 54.15 61.25 52.05 33.91 51.42 
Niger - 0.1 - 0.08 0.03 0.1 0.04 0.31 - 0.07 
Nigeria - 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.18 0.6 0.96 0.62 0.37 0.54 
Rwanda 0.13 1.79 0.3 3.35 12.11 5.81 5.43 1.9 9.93 13.11 
Senegal 0.03 0.4 1.84 0.42 0.3 1.9 1.75 1.79 0.71 0.15 
Sierra Leone 0.21 0.72 - 0.74 0.06 l.l5 2.19 0.75 3.8 2.5 
Somalia 2.49 11.38 11.87 9.93 10.75 13.46 11.37 7.45 3.93 5.29 
South Africa - - - 37.87 29.73 19.6 33.24 41.06 31.11 40.88 
Sudan 7.05 11.6 1.93 6.27 5.19 5.25 2.21 4.08 10.42 6.84 
Tanzania 149.57 143 93.07 91 51.29 45.25 65.18 48.18 59.84 46.21 
Togo 0.03 2.41 - 0.32 1.08 0.19 1.52 0.11 0.07 0.29 
Tunisia 18.95 7.78 7.29 2.21 7.36 1.18 1.17 0.51 0.42 1.51 
Uganda 14.54 34.26 29 16.58 25.38 25.31 32.65 31.33 9.66 20.34 
Zambia 37.17 90 79.5 34.47 35.49 32.41 31.12 21.32 13.88 15.25 
Zimbabwe 36.35 36.06 64.55 35.79 33.95 28.98 35.94 22.9 19.74 19.11 
Japan Total Gross aDA 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Algeria 4.59 6.58 7.61 4.36 2 2.21 0.9 2.07 0.48 0.8 
Angola 0.01 0.09 3 0.12 0.12 0.12 5.17 11.98 17.85 21.95 
Benin 2.89 11.6 5.4 16.97 11.37 12.28 44.74 18.81 32.95 14.16 
Burkina Faso 1.74 4.35 9.3 6.88 11.82 6.66 14.85 8.24 8.85 28.18 
Burundi 9.98 12.11 12.66 8.21 7.42 4.14 1.0 I - - 1.06 
Cameroon 4.69 16.41 9.39 11.4 10.13 3.16 7.1 4.91 9.71 21.9 
Central African Rep. 8.73 8.35 20.21 14.27 10.43 49.8 30.61 19.97 14 18.14 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 69.77 21.02 4.78 0.51 4.45 5.38 4.53 5.76 0.04 0.12 
Congo, Rep. 0.38 3.26 1.92 2.4 0.38 0.3 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.04 
Cote d'Ivoire 55.23 51.03 12 43.12 20.4 54.87 58.39 33.51 39.99, 56.1 
Egypt 169.79 640.75 110.59 2168.1 188.99 242.83 201.46 125.52 91.71 146.77 
Ethiopia 11.23 17.64 10.5 47.64 43.89 62.49 50.15 37.33 26.08 40.38 
Gabon 0.14 0.42 0.54 0.54 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.83 0.5 0.33 
Ghana 71.9 116.06 71.29 85.65 137.56 126.65 115.3 77.17 159.8] ] 19.55 
Kenya 101.25 205.82 139.76 157.67 ]46.1 ] 2J6.7 113.85 87.6 71.06 92.48 
Liberia 6.42 0.55 0.2 0.06 0.03 - - 0.45­ 1.47 
Libya 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Madagascar 16.75 56.83 16.47 48.91 36.99 30.01 51.93 30.2 52.26 50.35 
Malawi 46.75 19.7 25.79 26.29 101.43 5 I.l5 68.25 41.45 53.66 41.68 
Mali 12.28 16.47 9.98 9.09 22.31 48.21 38.43 26.38 27.22 27.58 
Mauritius 7.37 6.34 1.89 1.66 1.22 8.3 5.16 6.74 6.18 3.33 
Morocco 111.64 32.48 42.86 66.56 77.48 44.82 62.51 38.16 50.64 73.25 
Mozambique 17.47 16.42 39.84 20.18 44.7 41.26 32.17 39.98 41.53 64.27 
Niger 38.67 34.75 22.55 29.17 43.39 22.03 8.03 17.8 14.4 19.61 
Nigeria 82.78 19.59 50.42 15.03 9.87 13.3 1.63 0.64 0.62 2.19 
Rwanda 14.36 9.21 16.81 14.94 16.47 1.5 0.55 8.13 9.03 7.95 
Senegal 82.06 26.39 65.02 35.6 76.87 75.44 59.35 26.85 34.36 60.85 
Sierra Leone 5.97 0.88 3.84 4.1 10.66 3.62 0.85 1.39 I.2 1.17 
Somalia 10.2 1.53 0.15 0.18 - 0.02 0.01 0.4 0.01 -
South Africa - - - 1.8 3.09 4.34 7.3 28.91 30.83 14.06 
Sudan 38.94 51.02 27.44 15.22 20.6 21.19 18.64 0.47 0.17 0.6 
Tanzania 44.25 61.16 79.65 99.9 107.21 126.86 109.49 65.88 102.86 81.02 
Togo 9.33 8.8 1.91 3.48 1.74 0.68 27.24 28.53 11.93 9.39 
Tunisia 35.62 30.26 7.35 11.81 6.31 8.55 14.02 29.36 45.69 48.84 
Uganda 9.47 14.92 14.57 39.67 48.79 41.8 26.9 26.86 23.91 28.22 
Zambia 40.11 103.92 126.37 90.86 111.18 111.66 48.27 51.58 36.09 66.68 
Zimbabwe 25.78 43.86 51.5 I 30.91 28.6J 68.83 49.48 41.16 29.06 81.73 
Appendix B 
U.S. Normal OLS Model 
nificance of F 
.0006 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita -3.0Ie-06 -.190 1.50e-06 -2.007 .047 
Imports from 
The U.S. .0653 .230 .0284 2.295 .023 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0003 -.217 .0001 -2.449 .016 
Daily Caloric 
Intake 6.48e-07 .022 3.08e-06 0.210 .834 
Oil Dummy -.0024 -.097 .0023 -1.017 .311 
War Dummy .0071 .235 .0031 2.303 .023 
France Normal OLS Model 
Si nificance of F 
.0000 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita -5.55e-06 -.213 1.90e-06 -2.920 .004 
Imports from 
France .1368 .708 .0127 10.767 .000 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0004 -.146 .0002 -2.263 .025 
Daily Caloric 
Intake -.0000 -.266 4.26e-06 -3.704 .000 
Oil Dummy .0013 .024 .0035 0.377 .707 
War Dummy .0036 .057 .0041 0.886 .377 
Sweden Normal OLS Model 
Si nificance of F 
.0000 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita 5.56e-07 .050 1.15e-06 0.482 .631 
Imports from 
Sweden .4027 .286 .1236 3.259 .001 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0001 -.108 .0001 -1.188 .237 
Daily Caloric 
Intake -8.78e-06 -.409 2.41e-06 -3.646 .000 
Oil Dummy -.0012 -.057 .0018 -0.661 .510 
War Dummy .0052 .217 .0021 2.413 .017 
Japan Normal OLS Model 
Si nificance of F 
.0000 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita -2.00e-06 -.210 8.00e-07 -2.496 .014 
Imports from 
Japan .0412 .120 .0253 1.627 .106 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0003 -.254 .0001 -3.371 .001 
Daily Caloric 
Intake -6.83e-06 -.315 1.94e-06 -3.530 .001 
Oil Dummy -.0044 -.225 .0014 -3.106 .002 
War Dummy -.0034 -.146 .0018 -1.890 .061 
Appendix C 
u.s. Panel-Corrected OLS Model 
Significance .0001 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Panel-
Corrected 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita -3.01e-06 1.03e-06 -2.913 .004 
Imports from 
U.S. .0653 .0375 1.741 .082 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0003 .0001 -3.085 .002 
Daily Caloric 
Intake 6.48e-07 3.91e-06 0.166 .868 
Oil Dummy -.0024 .0016 -1.479 .139 
War Dummy .0071 .0035 2.037 .042 
France Panel-Corrected OLS Model 
[ Significance .0000 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Panel-
Corrected 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita -5.55e-06 2.22e-06 -2.498 .012 
Imports from 
France .1368 .0185 7.385 .000 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0004 .0001 -3.021 .003 
Daily Caloric 
Intake -.0000 3.48e-06 -4.537 .000 
Oil Dummy .0013 .0033 0.398 .691 
War Dummy .0036 .0037 0.964 .335 
Sweden Panel-Corrected OLS Model 
Significance .0000 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Panel-
Corrected 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita 5.56e-07 3.70e-07 1.501 .133 
Imports from 
Sweden .4027 .1087 3.706 .000 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0001 .0001 -1.168 .243 
Daily Caloric 
Intake -8.78e-06 2.15e-06 -4.091 .000 
Oil Dummy -.0012 .0006 -1.865 .062 
War Dummy .0052 .0036 1.438 .150 
Japan Panel-Corrected OLS Model 
Significance .0000 
Independent 
Variable Coefficients 
Panel-
Corrected 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Significance 
oft 
GNP Per Capita -2.00e-06 6.4ge-07 -3.079 .002 
Imports from 
Japan .0412 .0373 1.103 .270 
% of GNP 
Spent on the 
Military 
-.0003 .0001 -3.394 .001 
Daily Caloric 
Intake -6.83e-06 1.70e-06 -4.019 .000 
Oil Dummy -.0044 .0012 -3.571 .000 
War Dummy -.0034 .0018 -1.914 .056 
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